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Abstract
This research employed an explanatory case study to compare supplier production 
capabilities for enhancing productivity gains between Uganda commercial forestry and 
sugarcane sector value chains. Key study results indicated that only 18% of the sugar-
cane farmers achieved the desired industry productivity output of at least 100 t/ha from 
their fields, with majority (82%) of the cane growers producing below expected industry 
productivity output. In the forestry sector, 41.3% of the farmers achieved the desired 
industry performance targets, with 58.7% of the growers performing below expected 
performance targets. The major buyers’ supplier development behaviour as seen in the 
diffusion of knowledge, skills and appropriate technology along vertical and horizontal 
collaborative value chain relationships, explains this paradox. Millers in the sugarcane 
sector used contractors to diffuse knowledge and skills, which weakened the supplier 
production capabilities. In the forestry sector, with the support of development part-
ner agencies, productivity was higher due to effective diffusion of knowledge, skills and 
appropriate technology to primary producers. This finding strongly points to the need to 
implement deliberate supplier development strategies by the development partner agen-
cies and governments, if productivity gains are to be improved within the agri-business 
value chains in developing countries.
Keywords: global value chains, productivity, supplier production capabilities, investment 
asset specificity, transactional costs and opportunistic behaviors
1. Introduction
The globalization of economic activities requires an understanding of the dispersed value cre-
ation activities that capture processes across space and time, which in turn precipitate interest 
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in global value chains (GVCs). Participation in global value chain is therefore seen as impera-
tive for firm survival and sustainability. This has placed GVC participation on a high-level 
policy agenda by development partners as a prescription template for agribusiness produc-
tivity growth and competitiveness of developing countries, especially sub-Saharan Africa. 
Development organizations are investing in organization competencies to participate in GVC.1 
The World Trade Organization articulates the importance of GVC participations as follows:
“Any discussion today of international trade and investment policy that fails to acknowledge 
the centrality of global value chains (GVCs) would be considered outmoded and of question-
able relevance” [1].
Despite the interest in GVC participation, intense debate still lingers over root causes of why 
some countries are advancing in the global marketplace, while others are failing to do so 
[2]. Supply chain production capabilities to drive productivity gains for growth have been 
highlighted by the value chain (VC) fraternity researchers as an area of interest to investigate 
this phenomenon. In Adam Smith’s classical work, entitled The Wealth of Nations [3], Adam 
contended that productivity gains are vital to the economy, and it is the true measure of a 
nations growth, as more (higher output) is being accomplished with less (minimum inputs). 
Capital and labor are both scarce resources, so maximizing their impact is a core concern 
of modern business. Productivity gains have been identified to emanate from technological 
advancements such as information and communication technologies, supply chain and logis-
tics improvements, and improved skill levels within the workforce.
This study investigated the presence of productivity gains among primary producers, that 
is, the supply workforce (farmers or primary commodity producers) capabilities in Uganda’s 
agribusiness value chains. The level of available supply production capabilities determines 
the choice of the governance structure to coordinate interfirm relationships, which can be 
done either through spot markets (arm’s length transactions and/or cash transactions with 
immediate delivery) or hierarchies (production of goods and services by single integrated 
firm) [4]. Ref. [2] GVC framework, considered to be an extension of Williamson’s transac-
tion cost economics (TCE) theory, offers intermediary networks or quasi-hierarchies [5] for 
interfirm relationship coordination and production organization in the form of modular, rela-
tional, and captive value chains. The existence of the various networks for the organization of 
production and coordination of interfirm relationships implies the existence of both vertical 
and horizontal linkage mechanisms.
Porter [6] argued that the existence of comparative advantage, economies of scale, and excessive 
vertical integration are no longer sources of competitiveness and innovation. He contended that 
close linkages between buyers, suppliers, and other institutions are now the source for firm, 
industry, and sector competitiveness, as reflected in productivity [7]. This statement affirms 
1For example, World Bank (WB), African Development Bank (AfDB), United States Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID), Department for International Development (DFID), International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 
Trust Africa, European Union, and African Union
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that the level of strength of collaborative relationships in both vertical and horizontal linkages 
is the source for productivity gains.
According to Navdi and Halder [8], the cluster theoretical approach assists in assessing 
the gains of clustering (i.e., grouping similar objects) as a result of joint action, while the 
VC approach explores vertical linkages between firms and external actors. Although both 
approaches offer complementary synergies to each other, they do not elaborate on the mea-
sures applicable in assessing the strength of the interfirm relationships [2, 9]. This missing 
link is filled by the transaction cost economic approach [4], which analyzes investment trans-
actional costs involved in interfirm relationships. Williamson [4] identified the transactional 
costs in the form of specific investment asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency of transactions, 
and opportunism. In this study, we contend that building supplier production capabilities 
involves undertaking investment asset specificity in terms of provision of inputs, knowledge, 
and skills transferred to primary producers with a purpose of building production capabili-
ties for productivity gains. It also involves transactional costs related to searching, monitor-
ing, and enforcement of contracts by either party, costs considered as eroding profit margins. 
More investments in building mutual trust relationships are crucial in order to minimize 
opportunism. This study adopted these measures in assessing the strength of collaborative 
vertical and horizontal linkages for the building of supplier production capabilities.
The purpose of this research was to contribute to the understanding of the link between the 
supplier/growers’ production capabilities and productivity growth in the GVC of sugarcane 
and forestry sectors and as such offer some key insights into the emerging GVC theory. This 
was achieved by investigating the strength of value chain practices within both vertical and 
horizontal linkages between growers and buyers/millers and among growers. Therefore, this 
study undertook a comparative assessment of supplier production capabilities for achieving 
desired industry productivity gains in the commercial sugarcane sector relative to the forestry 
sector in Uganda. The following research questions guided the inquiry:
1. How does investment asset specificity in vertical and horizontal linkages explain perfor-
mance differences between commercial sugarcane and forestry sector value chains?
2. How does coordination of transactional costs in vertical and horizontal linkages explain 
performance differences between commercial sugarcane and forestry sector value chains?
3. How do actors’ behaviors in vertical and horizontal linkages explain performance differ-
ences between commercial sugarcane and forestry sector value chains?
2. Methodology
This research employed a case study approach as the major research strategy, with a survey 
complementing the results of the case study. The purpose of this research was to contribute to 
emerging GVC theory [2] and hence suitability of case study [10].
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Field-based and multiple data collection methods (questionnaire survey, interviews, archives, 
and observations) were used to gather empirical data to address the research questions and 
for triangulation of results [10–14].
Industry-specific information sources such as Uganda Sugar Cane Technologist Association 
(USCTA), Uganda Sugar Manufacturers Association (USMA), and Sawlog Production Grant 
Scheme (SPGS) project provided expected industry productivity baselines [15–17]. The total 
number of registered producers was 389 of which 298 where functional as per SPGS per-
formance report 2012/2013. Kinyara Sugar Works Limited provided growers productivity 
data for the years 2010/2011 to 2012/2013 financial years. The total number of out-growers 
in Kinyara Sugarcane Cluster was approx. 6000, of which 105 were registered and approxi-
mately 77 commercial producers were considered functional. The total number of anticipated 
respondents participating in the study was 100 (survey tool) and 20 (qualitative tool or inter-
views), from both forestry and sugarcane value chains. The response rate was 46 to the ques-
tionnaires and 9 to the interviews in forestry industry and 32 to the questionnaires and 10 to 
the interviews, respectively. The overall response rate was 81%. The sample size of 97 was 
generally found appropriate for studies of this nature, in line with [10] recommendation of 
cases between 4 and 10 as appropriate.
The cases involved in the entire value chain as the principal unit of analysis are explored and 
analyzed at three sublevels: micro (primary producers/growers’ enterprises), meso (industry 
experts, miller’s representatives, and association executives in the value chain), and macro 
(assessment of national policies and regulations). Principal component analysis was run for 
purposes of grouping items. Empirical data was analyzed using within case analysis that 
enabled intimate familiarity with each case as stand-alone entity and cross-case pattern anal-
ysis that enabled constant comparison of theory and data—iterating toward a fit between 
theory and data. Figure 1 represents a summary of the methodology procedure.
2.1. Measures of productivity gains
Adam Smith [3] in his book of the wealth of nations identified three productivity measures, 
namely, farm output, manufactured goods, and labor to produce goods. This study was inter-
ested in productivity gains in agribusiness and therefore considered farm output as the lead-
ing measure for farm enterprise productivity. The study adopted country-specific industry 
reports published by the Uganda Sugar Manufacturers Association (USMA) which consider 
farm output of 100 tons/ha as the baseline productivity measure of sugarcane maturity of 
18–20 months [17]. The forestry sector productivity reports were obtained from the Sawlog 
Production Grant Scheme, assessing performance of growers and providing indicative 
desired contract performance measures of 90% in agronomical practices.
2.2. Measures of strength in vertical and horizontal collaboration for building supplier 
production capabilities
In the context of value chain discipline, vertical linkages represent conduits for the transfer of 
learning, skills, information, technical, financial, and business services from one firm to another 
along the value chain. On the other hand, horizontal linkages represent longer-term cooperative 
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arrangements among firms that involve interdependence, trust, and resource pooling in order 
to achieve joint action or jointly accomplish common goals.
The transactional cost approach provides measures for assessing the strength of the market 
coordination mechanisms [4]. The measures include investment asset specificity costs (such as 
knowledge, skills, and physical production inputs), coordination transaction costs (timely pay-
ments, information search, contract monitoring, and enforcement), frequency of the transac-
tions, and quality of relationships, that is, mutually beneficial or exploitative relationships. This 
study adopted these measures except frequency of transactions in assessing the strength of verti-
cal and horizontal collaboration in building supplier production capabilities in the value chains.
3. Results and discussion
Research question 1: How does investment asset specificity in vertical and horizontal linkages 
explain performance differences between commercial sugarcane and forestry sector value 
chains?
Figure 1. Research methodology flow chart.
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The findings of the study suggested strong collaborative vertical linkages for building sup-
plier production capabilities, as can be attested with the two-sample t-test. A comparison 
of the mean value for asset specificity in vertical relationships revealed that there was a sig-
nificant difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry-sugarcane), Pr (T < t) = 0.0002. This 
means that there was a stronger collaborative relationship between millers and producers 
for inputs support, knowledge, and skills transfer in the sugarcane sector compared to the 
forestry sector. However, a nuanced view by qualitative data revealed that transfer of knowl-
edge, skills, and inputs support was through contractors and not directly to primary sugar-
cane producers as evidenced by the quotations below:
“Planning is one of the biggest problems. The basic thing which a farmer gives is land… since farmers get 
inputs and using contractors for land preparation, harvesting and transporting, this creates sluggishness. 
i.e. some farmers think cane is for Kinyara, but now we are telling them to take it as a business so that they 
can plan, and save. Further, many farmers have no records…we hope that if farmers take up operations, 
they will develop capacity and protect their investments” (Out-Grower Manager, Sugar Mill).
The out-grower manager’s statement was also validated by a primary sugarcane producer as 
stated below:
“Under the previous miller, harvesting, loading and transporting were done by the farmers’ company 
– which was the business arm of the association. When current management came on board, this was 
abolished and they preferred to use contractors. With the previous miller knowledge was gained; we 
used to have courses in Kampala which was helpful, however, with the current miller not much has been 
gained” (Respondent Sugar).
Therefore, the qualitative findings above suggest weaker collaborative relationships for build-
ing production capabilities between millers and growers in the sugarcane sector. Further, the 
quotation below corroborated the quantitative findings of weak collaborative relationships 
for building production capabilities between millers and growers in the forestry sector.
“No miller is supporting growers, Nile Ply just buys from growers but without supporting them” 
(Program Manager, SPGS/Forestry).
On the other hand, the forestry sector had strong collaborative horizontal linkages existing 
with respect to investment asset specificity. A comparison of the mean value for asset invest-
ment specificity in horizontal relationships revealed that there was a significant difference in 
the mean rating by sector (forestry-sugarcane), Pr (T > t) = 0.0023. This means that there was 
a stronger collaborative relationship among producers and/or producer support agencies for 
inputs support, knowledge, and skills transfer in the forestry sector than the sugarcane sector. 
The above quantitative data finding was supported by qualitative data findings below:
“SPGS support has enabled at least 30% to improve production planning skills…. The change is more 
than significant. availability of forest valuation guidelines also gives growers basics on what price they 
cannot go below (reserve price) during negotiations in order to realize a return on their investments” 
(Program Manager—SPGS/Forestry).
The quote above suggests that transfer of knowledge, skills, and inputs support occurred 
directly to forestry producers from development agencies. This was evidenced by the t-test 
results that showed very strong significant differences (forestry-sugarcane), Pr (T > t) = 0.0000, 
regarding access to both technical and financial support from farmers’ development agencies. 
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This finding is also corroborated by both foreign and local tours (see Figures 2 and 3) orga-
nized by SPGS—a development support agency in conjunction with UTGA—the National 
Farmers Association, whose aim is to equip forestry growers with technical knowledge for 
building production capabilities.
The findings render support for strong horizontal collaborative relationships for building 
production capabilities. Findings also complemented with the evidenced adduced in the quo-
tation below:
“Growers have acquired technical competency in plantation establishment, maintenance such as thin-
ning, pruning, marking and harvesting….Good relationships exist, especially those under UTGA. 
When we call cluster meetings, we see the will to share, cooperate, and avail their plantations for study” 
(Association General Manager, UTGA/Forestry).
Figure 2. Ugandan forestry commercial farmers learning and nurturing of quality tree seedlings. Source: Primary field 
data courtesy of SPGS study tour Mondi nursery facility (South Africa).
Figure 3. Ugandan forestry commercial farmers on networking and information sharing testing the strength of the pole 
required by the market. Source: Primary field data courtesy of UTGA/SPGS local study tour New Forestry Company 
Ltd—pole treatment plant in Uganda.
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The statement by one of the growers below did not discount the above statements:
“Yes, knowledge through newsletters, client meetings… You access information on prices, even if some-
one (buyer/miller) comes with a monopoly, but he realises that you are able to chip in from an informed 
position” (Respondent, Forestry).
However, with respect to sugarcane sector, qualitative data further supported quantitative 
data that there were no gains in building production capabilities from horizontal collabora-
tive linkages as evidenced with the quotation below:
“Percentage wise in knowledge and skills transfer is still low, … the previous associa-
tion (KSGL) incurred liabilities, hence farmers lost the trust but now picking up slowly” 
(Association Chairman, Sugarcane Sector).
Our observations on the question about the influence of investment asset specificity in vertical 
and horizontal linkages on performance differences between commercial sugarcane and for-
estry sector value chains is as follows. The sugarcane sector exhibited high investment asset 
specificity in vertical linkages between primary producers and millers. This was evidenced by 
quantitative data which suggested strong collaborative vertical linkages for building supplier 
production capabilities. However, a nuanced view of the qualitative data pointed to the exis-
tence of production capabilities in the vertical linkages but residing in the use of contractors 
rather than the cane growers themselves. This finding was supported by a study of small-scale 
growers in the South African sugar industry that arrived at similar results [18]. Therefore, 
this finding suggested that growers were heavily dependent on the millers and contractors 
employed by the millers to offer services to the contracted growers. It was this level of high 
dependency of growers upon millers that could offer plausible explanations for failure to 
develop production capabilities among most growers in the Ugandan sugarcane sector.
On the other hand, quantitative data revealed a stronger collaborative relationship among 
producers and/or producer support agencies for availing inputs, knowledge, and skills 
transfer in the forestry sector than the sugarcane sector. This finding was corroborated by 
qualitative data and validated by observatory field data, which confirmed that the trans-
fer of knowledge, skills, and inputs support occurred directly to forestry primary produc-
ers. This was done by development partner agencies through provision of both technical 
and financial support accompanied with foreign and local exposure learning platforms (see 
Figures 2 and 3), with a purpose of building production capabilities for achieving produc-
tivity gains. This finding supports the GVC literature, as argued by GVC proponents such 
as [19, 20] that a combination of technical and investment support in highly governed chains 
explains how relatively underdeveloped regions become major export producers in a short 
period of time. They cited the example of the Brazilian shoe industry in the 1970s and the 
Vietnamese garment industry in the late 1990s. Made a similar observation in his study of 
the textile and garment supply chain in South Africa [14]. He found out that companies that 
had closer collaboration in training and assistance attained a higher diffusion of skills in a 
shorter time to achieve supply chain efficiency levels required to compete effectively. This 
scenario can be described as a true reflection of Uganda’s evolving commercial forestry sec-
tor, which enjoys support from development agencies and producer associations that links 
both primary producers and millers.
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Further, the proponents of the cluster theoretical framework argue that diffusion of produc-
tion capabilities is not only limited to GVC participants, but there is also knowledge and 
skills “spillover” in a geographical area and/or localities of business operations [8, 21–26]. 
They argued that impact of knowledge and skills “spillover” accounts for the rise of entrepre-
neurship in various forms such as functional upgrading, new entrants in the existing clusters 
and value chains, and the start of new parallel competitive value chains. This entrepreneurial 
potential can be said to be available especially in Uganda’s commercial forestry value chain 
sector, only if other agro-commodities can have a ready market for commercial production.
The findings above explained the investment asset specificity in vertical and horizontal link-
ages for interfirm relationships. However, as firms engage in the exchange process, they may 
be vulnerable to coordination transactional costs and opportunism by either party involved 
in the execution of the contracts. The next section presents and discusses comparative results 
with respect to vulnerability to transactional costs in both vertical and horizontal collabora-
tive relationships for building production capabilities in order to achieve productivity gains.
Research question 2: How does coordination of transactional costs in vertical and horizontal 
linkages explain performance differences between commercial sugarcane and forestry sector 
value chains?
A comparison of the mean value for transactional costs in vertical relationships shows 
that there was a moderate difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry-sugarcane), Pr 
(T < t) = 0.0266. This means that transactional costs such as delayed payments from millers to 
producers and information search for production costs were perceived to have been more of 
a challenge in the sugarcane sector than the forestry sector. This finding was supported by 
qualitative data suggesting weaker collaborative relationships between millers and growers 
in the sugarcane sector, as per quotations below:
“Enough money and/or cyclic revenue is needed to run the business but KSL has a tendency of late pay-
ments going between 60–90 days. The delayed payment causes unnecessary interest accruals resulting 
into marginal profits” (Respondent, Sugarcane Sector).
“Initially we used to give cash advances to purchase plantations, and provided transport. 
However, the system was abused whereby some suppliers diverted the funds into other busi-
nesses… currently, we pay them within five working days after delivery to enhance their cash 
flow and introduced suppliers to Eco-bank for loan access. Right now the suppliers are self-
sufficient, they can support themselves” (Plant Manager, Forestry Mill).
“The main challenge is the continuous reshuffle of ministers; before a minister gets acquainted with the 
industry another one is appointed. Even now the permanent secretaries are being transferred. At one 
time we broke down the costs to Minister Mukwaya. The minister requested the miller to give her the 
breakdown, but the miller refused. Recently, another meeting was organised with the Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Cooperatives (MTIC) involving both out-growers and millers. The out-growers gave their 
cost breakdown of approx. 60 percent but the miller declined to give a cost breakdown” (Respondent, 
Association Executive Member and Opinion Leader (Sugar)).
The quotations above revealed that cost of searching for production costs of the value chain 
did not only impact upon transactional costs but also the reluctance by millers to reveal their 
production costs suggested possibility of opportunistic behaviors.
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Our observations therefore are that some level of vulnerability to transactional costs between 
millers and growers in the sugarcane sector exits, compared to the forestry sector. However, 
similar results were obtained in the horizontal relationships in the forestry sector in com-
parison to the sugarcane sector. Using two-sample t-test, a comparison of the mean value 
for transactional costs in horizontal relationships shows that there was a slight difference 
in the mean rating by sector (forestry-sugarcane), Pr (T > t) = 0.0548. This means that there 
was suggestive evidence of minimum occurrence of transactional costs among producers 
in the forestry sector than the sugarcane sector. This quantitative finding was validated by 
the qualitative data finding below, which suggested occurrence of transactional costs as a 
result of replacing labor force taken by another grower without the consent of the labor force 
owner:
“I think we trust each other because we have same common ground. I have not seen many conflicts in 
client meetings, except one time a farmer accused his neighbors of stealing his workers.” (Respondent, 
Forestry).
Therefore, on the question of the impact on performance differences between commercial 
sugarcane and forestry sector value chains regarding coordination of transaction costs within 
vertical and horizontal linkages, we concluded as follows. Moderate transactional costs such 
as information search costs and delayed payments from millers to producers were more of a 
challenge in the sugarcane sector than the forestry sector. This finding supported existence 
of weaker collaborative relationships between millers and growers for building production 
capabilities in the sugarcane sector. In the forestry sector, quantitative data revealed evidence 
of minimum occurrence of transactional costs among producers compared to the sugarcane 
sector. This quantitative finding was corroborated by the qualitative data finding which sug-
gested occurrence of transactional costs as a result of replacing labor force taken by another 
grower without the consent of the labor force owner.
The above findings demonstrate that both vertical and horizontal collaborative relationships 
between primary producers and millers and among primary producers in the sugarcane and 
forestry industry value chains were vulnerable to some levels of transactional costs. Evidence 
of transactional costs suggests existence of opportunistic behaviors [4, 27]. Opportunistic 
behaviors were investigated by this study in the next question below.
Research question 3: How do actors’ behaviors in vertical and horizontal linkages explain 
performance differences between commercial sugarcane and forestry sector value chains?
Vulnerability to transactional costs is mainly attributed to opportunistic behaviors. A com-
parison of the mean opportunism in vertical relationships revealed that there was a slight dif-
ference in the mean rating by sector (forestry-sugarcane), Pr (T < t) = 0.0712. This means that 
there was suggestive evidence of opportunism causing mistrust between millers and produc-
ers in the sugarcane sector than the forestry sector. This finding was validated by qualitative 
data findings below:
“Fairly good trust… however there is lack of transparency on the weigh bridge” (Association Chair-
man, Sugarcane Sector).
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This above quotation was supported by the miller’s representative quotation below suggest-
ing some level of opportunistic behaviors along the sugarcane value chain.
“Small farmers are mainly the problem because at times they sell the fertilisers, but with commercial 
farmers, this is not quite rampart” (Agricultural Engineering Manager, Sugar Mill).
Generally, the finding of suspicious opportunistic behaviors between growers and millers val-
idates the existence of weak collaborative relationships for building supplier production capa-
bilities. On the other hand, a comparison of the mean value for opportunism in the horizontal 
relationships shows that there was no significant difference in the mean rating by sector (for-
estry-sugarcane), Pr (T > t) = 0.1380. This meant that manifestations of opportunistic behaviors 
were not quite rampart among producers in both the forestry and sugarcane sectors.
Therefore, in answering the question on how actors’ behaviors in vertical and horizontal 
linkages explain performance differences between commercial sugarcane and forestry sector 
value chains, we observed the following. Quantitative data revealed suggestive evidence of 
opportunistic behaviors causing mistrust between millers and producers in the sugarcane 
sector than the forestry sector. This finding was validated by qualitative data that suggested 
the source of mistrust being due to lack of transparency of the miller’s weighbridge and pos-
sibility of diverting inputs by growers to other farm activities rather than sugarcane growing.
The above findings show that vertical collaborative relationships between primary produc-
ers and millers in the sugarcane industry value chains were characterized by suspicion, thus 
affecting mutual trust as compared to the forestry sector value chain. This finding is in agree-
ment with similar studies, which found out that mutually benefiting relationships develop 
trust [14, 28], while exploitative relationships exhibit low levels of trust and tend to be charac-
terized by tensions that affect productivity gains in the value chains [29–31]. This was found 
to be true in Uganda’s sugarcane sector value chain. In such circumstances, the GVC theo-
retical framework recognizes that reshaping of the value chain governance structures lowers 
opportunistic behaviors accounting for vulnerability to transactional costs [2, 32]. Our finding 
on this question also points to the potential to increase participation market powers by the 
Uganda’s sugarcane primary producers through shifting away from a captive value chain 
governance structure characterized by high levels of dependency, to either a modular or rela-
tional value chain governance structures, characterized by less dependency.
On the other hand, findings of the study revealed that manifestations of opportunistic behav-
iors were not quite rampart in the horizontal relationships among primary producers in both 
the forestry and sugarcane sectors. This finding indicates that there are opportunities for pri-
mary producers especially in the sugarcane sector for joint action investment strategies in 
order to minimize opportunistic behaviors causing transactional costs in vertical linkages.
4. Conclusion
The key findings of the study revealed that (1) the sugarcane sector exhibited high investment 
asset specificity in vertical linkages between primary producers and millers compared to the 
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forestry sector. This finding suggested strong collaborative vertical linkages for building sup-
plier production capabilities to enhance productivity gains. However, a nuanced view of the 
qualitative data pointed to the existence of production capabilities in the vertical linkages 
but residing in the use of contractors rather than the cane growers themselves. On the other 
hand, stronger collaborative relationship existed among producers and/or producer support 
agencies for availing inputs, knowledge, and skills transfer in the forestry sector than the sug-
arcane sector. This finding was corroborated by qualitative data and validated by observatory 
field data confirming building of production capabilities among forestry primary produc-
ers for productivity gains. (2) Findings of this study revealed that control of the diffusion of 
knowledge and skills transfer not directly to primary producers, but through the use of con-
tractors, was a strategy that enabled the miller(s) to continuously earn higher rents by offering 
low commodity prices, inputs, and services at high prices to the sugarcane primary producers 
through maintenance of weak supplier production capabilities. (3) Opportunistic behaviors 
accounted for the prevalence of suggestive evidence of transactional costs between miller(s) 
and growers in the sugarcane sector compared to the forestry sector. The above key findings 
also offered plausible explanations for the observed performance differences in achieving 
industry productivity benchmarks between sugarcane and forestry sector primary producers. 
Study results indicated that only 18% of the farmers achieved the desired industry productiv-
ity output of at least 100 t/ha from their cane fields, implying that majority (82%) of the cane 
growers were producing below expected industry productivity output. This was in contrast 
to the forestry sector whose study results indicated that 41.3% of the farmers achieved the 
desired industry performance targets, suggesting that only 58.7% of the growers performed 
below expected performance targets.
5. Theoretical and policy contributions
Theoretically, this study has brought into insight new research frontiers. The dominant 
theoretical argument within the GVC discipline is that while highly governed structures 
contribute to fast acquisition of production capabilities, they can also create barriers for func-
tional upgrading and/or investments in forward linkages [19, 33]. This is because the lead 
firms protect their core capabilities such as acquisition of design and marketing capabilities 
from competition, in order to sustain earning higher rents. The findings in our study added 
another perspective by showing that the lead firms created barriers in backward linkages by 
controlling the diffusion of knowledge and skills transfer not directly to primary producers, 
but through the use of contractors. This strategy enabled the miller(s) to continuously earn 
higher rents by offering low commodity prices, inputs, and services at high prices to the pri-
mary producers through maintenance of weak supplier production capabilities. Therefore, 
this finding can be classified as a major contribution to the emerging GVC theoretical frame-
work [2], with respect to lead firms’ control of the diffusion knowledge and skills for building 
supply production capabilities in backward linkages, with intent for sustained earning of 
strategic rents.
This study provides insights to government and development partners’ policy regarding 
development of supplier production capabilities for productivity growth in the context of 
GVCs as follows:
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1. Policy program interventions need to be designed in a way that knowledge and skills will be 
made available to the primary producers. This will enable them to strengthen their production 
capabilities for effective participation and upgrading in the GVCs in developing economies.
2. Policy programs should be supported by the formation of robust primary growers’ asso-
ciations and/or cooperatives that provide a platform for joint action to effectively partici-
pate in GVCs.
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